# Rolls-Royce cooperation approach applicable in Hungary, and further VVER projects in Europe

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Trusted to deliver excellence



### We are an independent world leader of digital safety I&C solutions for the nuclear industry











#### **Safety Systems**

Ensure the safety of nuclear reactors by meeting the functional & safety requirements for digital safety I&C systems

### **Control** and monitoring systems

Improve the plant availability and reduce operational, maintenance and training costs

#### Instrumentation

Safe and accurate measurements of neutron and thermodynamic information, in all types of conditions

#### Customer support

Integrated long term solutions to support operation across the lifecycle of the reactor

#### Integration

Driven by safety and availability, manage a comprehensive **I&C** dedicated solution

Safety and performance through technology and long term support



## We rely on a long history of on-time delivery of large I&C projects VVER reactors


### On-going...

- MOCHOVCE 3&4 Neutron instrumentation system
- LOVIISA 1&2 I&C modernization









### The key sucess factors:

- An early Conceptual Design Phase
- Collaboration between all stakeholders
- Simple and flexible design
- Srong processes

### ... and previous major I&C projects

- 4 x VVER Dukovany, whole Protection System modernization
- 2 x RBMK Ignalina, Diverse Reactor Trip
- 2 x VVER Metsamor, Neutron Flux Monitoring
- 2 x VVER Kozloduy, Neutron Flux Monitoring




## We rely on Spinline<sup>TM</sup> a validated safety I&C technology by Safety Authorities worldwide





### Our ambition is to support Rosatom's ambition on the export market facing key challenges






### Safety I&C is a major focus of Safety Authorities and can lead to significant cost overruns when poorly managed

I&C represents « only » 8 to 10% of the NPP cost and safety I&C a fraction of it

However, challenges faced by some utilities, reactor vendors and I&C suppliers in receiving the local Safety Authority's approval has led to large delays and cost overruns with major financial and reputational impacts

Figure 35: NPP percentage cost breakdown





## A key lessons learnt: the Reference Plant's I&C design only is not sufficient

### I&C Architecture needs to be adapted to each application instead of imposing a standard solution:

- Based on the Defense in Depth and Diversity needs;
- With due defense against Common-cause Failure, utilizing diversity, redundancy and independence.

### **Gradual shift in Regulations and Standards:**


- From focusing on individual pieces of equipment to rather focusing on the system (or overall architecture) as a whole (systems engineering approach);
- From being prescriptive about technical features to becoming rather prescriptive about the process that one has to follow;

Still subject to interpretation by the Safety Authority



# **Upfront collaborative phase:**Key success factor for successful I&C licensing vs. tendering the Reference Plant's main I&C package

- From our experience, it is necessary to set up a Pre-project "Conceptual Design Phase" for the I&C important to safety
  - Led by Rosatom's Plant Designer and Rosatom's I&C Integrator
  - Involving the Owner and the Safety Authority
  - Involving one (or several) I&C technology providers
- Goals of this collaborative initiative are :
  - Agree interpretation of requirements from country-specific guides, WENRA, Owner, Plant Designer and translate into I&C language
  - Define the overall I&C Architecture based on requirements
  - Allocate functions and requirements to I&C systems
  - Allocate systems to platforms to check technology and economic feasibility
  - Get early review from the Safety Authority on main principles
- This will reduce Rosatom's licensing risk and provide design optimization of the overall I&C





### Our experience in Finland will benefit Rosatom for Hanhikivi-1

 Rolls-Royce has been involved since March 2013 with the Plant Designer Atomproekt, the Plant I&C Designer and Integrator VNIIAES and the EPC/General Contractors Rusatom Overseas and Titan-2



 On 30 June 2015, Fennovoima submitted their Construction License Application for FH1 NPP, stating that Rolls-Royce is one of the two possible suppliers of the Safety automation.

#### **FENNOVOIMA**


Application for a Construction License pursuant to Section 18 of the Nuclear Energy Act (990/1987) for the Hanhikivi 1 Nuclear Power Plant

June 2015 Updated August 5, 2015



### We are ready to extend this approach to the next VVER units in WENRA Countries

- Rolls-Royce's objective is to develop a Safety I&C approach for VVER-1200 (AES-2006)
  in regulatory regimes known as stringent and subject to WENRA recommendations
- Hanhikivi-1 and Paks II make up 3 units for which replication can provide significant economics savings
- Localization is of essence and our approach involves local Hungarian partners







Source: Rosatom, WENRA